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Introduction
As China's investment in Africa continues to show unprecedented
growth,' questions are being raised about many aspects of it,2 including
t Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law.
1. Detailed information on the growth of China-Africa economic relations is availa-
ble on the official website of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) at http:/
/www.focac.org/eng/.
2. A growing body of academic literature addresses various aspects of the relatively
new but robust economic relations between China and Africa. Some relatively recent
writings include: CHRIS ALDREN, CHINA IN AFRICA: PARTNER, COMPETITOR, OR HEGEMON?
(2007); DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, THE DRAGON'S Gwr: THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN AFRICA
(2009); WON KIDANE, CHINA-AFRICA DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE LAw, ECONOMICS AND CUL-
TURE OF ARBITRATION (2011); SARAH RAINE, CHINA'S AFRICAN CHALLENGES (2009); ROBERT 1.
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the adequacy of the legal infrastructure for the ordering of economic rela-
tions.3 The principal legal instruments that govern China-Africa invest-
ment relations are Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs).4 So far, China has
signed BITs with thirty-five African States,5 and sixteen of these agreements
have already come into force. 6 The BITs are divided into roughly three
prior generations, with an emerging fourth.7 This Article provides a com-
parative analysis of select China-Africa BITs in light of the China-Canada
BIT that came into effect on October 1, 2014.8 The China-Canada BIT is
selected for comparison not only because it is the most recent Chinese BIT
with a non-African state, but also because the text of the BIT-as well as the
debate surrounding its ratification-provide contemporary context for the
assessment of the nature, the stages of development, and the general state
of the China-Africa BITs regime.
Part I outlines the evolution of three prior China-Africa BIT genera-
tions. Part II provides an overview of the China-Canada BIT followed by
the China-Tanzania BIT, the most recent China-Africa BIT. Part III assesses
the implications of the China-Canada BIT for future China-Africa BITs.
Part IV engages the policy debate in light of the comparisons in Part II.
Part V offers conclusions.
I. China-Africa BITs in Comparative Context
The remarkable transformation of the Chinese economy over the last
three decades puts China in a unique position in modern history: it is a
ROTBERG, CHINA INTO AFRICA: TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE (2008); IAN TAYLOR, CHINA AND
AFRICA: ENGAGEMENT AND COMPROMISE (2006); CHINA RETURNS TO AFRICA: A RISING POWER
AND A CONTINENT EMBRACE (Chris Alden et al. eds., 2008). See most recently, DAVID H.
SHINN & JOSHUA EISENMAN, CHINA AND AFRICA: A CENTURY OF ENGAGEMENT (2012).
3. See generally KIDANE, supra note 2 (outlining the legal regimes that govern China-
Africa trade, investment, and commercial relations, and raising questions about the ade-
quacy of these regimes in ordering growing economic relations).
4. L. Yves Fortier, The Canadian Approach to Investment Protection: How Far We have
Come!, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 525, 528 (Christina Bender et al. eds., 2009) ("BITs emerged as a
tool in the Cold War period to promote FDI in developing countries.").
5. China is a party to a total of 145 BITs. The list and texts of most are available on
the official website of UNCTAD at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/Coun-
tryBits/42?type=c#iialnnerMenu.
6. The sixteen African countries are Algeria, Cape Verde, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon,
Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa,
Sudan, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe. The BITs that are signed but yet to come into effect are
with Benin, Botswana, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Dji-
bouti, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Namibia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Uganda, and Zambia. Comprehensive information about and copies of all of the BITs
that have come into effect are available on the official website of the Ministry of Com-
merce of China at http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/Nocategory/201111/2011110781
9474.shtml. Information about the BITs is also available on the official website of
UNCTAD at http://unctad.org/Sections/ditepcbb/docs/bitschina.pdf.
7. See NoRAH GALLAGHER & WENHUA SHAN, CHINESE INVESTMENT TREATIES 35 (2009).
8. The Agreement and background information are available at http://www.inter-
national.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/china-chine
.aspx?lang=eng. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
Vol. 49142
2016 China's Bilateral Investment Treaties with African States
developing country that is both the largest recipient of foreign investment
and the second largest exporter of capital. Since China adopted its open-
door policy in 1978, it has made considerable efforts to order its trade and
investment relations with the rest of the world by law.9 This is significant
because, as James Zimmerman puts it, "During the Cultural Revolution,
the few open law schools were closed and the law faculty sent to labor
camps. The law libraries and books were destroyed by the Red Guard."1 0
The ideological and historical factors that contributed to the advent and
sustenance from 1956 to 1978 of the Cultural Revolution had a significant
impact on Chinese approach to foreign investment." Ideologically, Marx-
ism and its disfavor for private ownership of the means of production had a
profound impact on China's approach to the protection of private property,
and therefore foreign investment.1 2 Historically, China's treatment by
Western powers, including the extraterritorial application of their laws,
appears to have delayed its acceptance of international legal principles that
emerged in the West.13 Once it opened up to the external world in 1978,
however, China began embracing international norms, despite suspicions
and misgivings.' 4
The international legal regime for the protection of foreign investment,
dominated by BITs,' 5 is essentially designed to protect the investments of
the developed world in the developing world.1 6 As Professor Salacuse puts
it, the political answer as to why a trade-like multilateral investment regime
failed to emerge is that "given the asymmetric nature of bilateral negotia-
tions between a strong, developed country, and a usually much weaker
developing country, the bilateral setting allows the developed country to
use its power more effectively than does a multilateral setting, where the
power may be much diluted."' 7 In essence, what sustains the bilateral
arrangements is the imbalance that favors investors of the developed world
in the developing world. The imbalance comes from the implicit under-
standing that although the promises and concessions are theoretically
reciprocal, in practice, virtually no investors of the developing country
invest in the developed county.' 8
9. See GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 7, at 6.
10. JAMES ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAw DESKBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR FOREIGN-INVESTED
ENTERPRISES 53 (3d ed. 2010) (citing J. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 602-17
(1990)).
11. See KIDANE, supra note 2, at 172-73.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw 554-55 (2d ed.
2008).
16. The United States for example is a party to forty-seven BITs as of this writing and
none of them is with a country that could be legitimately classified as developed. The
list and texts of the BITs are available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/
CountryBits/223#iialnnerMenu.
17. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT'L
LJ. 427, 464 (2010).
18. See id.
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This understanding encourages developed countries to enter into
bilateral investment treaties. It also explains BITs, such as the U.S.-Rwanda
BITs, which are in theory-but not in practice-reciprocal. No matter what
their terms, BITs are also attractive to the developing country, as they sig-
nal a willingness to open up doors for foreign investment.1 9 The parties to
these BITs almost invariably have differing motives. Hence, more than a
mere element of self-deception almost always underpins the great majority
of the North-South BITs.
China's position as both a major importer and exporter of capital puts
it in a serious theoretical dilemma as to the aforementioned rationale. As a
recipient of capital, it has all the incentives of a developing country to be
protective; while as an exporter of capital, it has all the incentives to seek
the most expansive rights for its nationals. This Part traces the evolution of
Chinese BITs with African states to see how they have changed alongside
China's own economic and ideological transformation.
A. Chinese BITs in the 1980s
Temporally, the first generation Chinese BITs roughly correspond to
the period between China's adoption of its open door policy in 1978 and
the beginning of the 1990s. 2 0 The BITs signed during this period were
primarily with European countries that, at the time, wanted to invest in
China. The first one was concluded with Sweden. 2 1 Of the approximately
thirty BITs that China signed during this period, only one BIT is with an
African state: Ghana. 2 2
While there are some notable differences between the China-Sweden
and China-Ghana BITs, there are some common defining features. For
example, the China-Sweden and China-Ghana BITs define the term "invest-
ment" in more or less identical terms:
(1) The term "investment" shall comprise every kind of asset invested by
investors of one Contracting State in the territory of the other Contracting
State in accordance with the laws and regulations of that State, and more
particularly, though not exclusively,
(a) movable and immovable property as well as any other rights in rem,
such as mortgage, lien, pledge, usufruct, and similar rights;
(b) shares or other kinds of interest in companies;
(c) title to money or any performance having an economic value;
(d) copyrights, industrial property rights, technical processes, trade-names,
and good-will; and
(e) such business-concessions under public law or under contract, includ-
ing concessions regarding the prospecting for, or the extraction or winning
19. The idea that BITs or any types of investment treaties increase foreign investment
has in recent times been called into question. See, e.g., THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOR-
EIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND
INVESTMENT FLOWS (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009).
20. GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 7, at 4-5.
21. See id. at 417.
22. China-International Investment Agreements, INv. Pot'y HuB, http://investmentpol
icyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/42?type=c#iialnnerMenu (last visited Nov.4, 2015).
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of natural resources, as give to their holder a legal position of some
duration.23
It is notable that both BITs regard title to money or a claim to money as
investment. Some later BITs and other prominent treaties, such as NAFTA,
expressly exclude money owed for the sale of goods. 24
On the other hand, the China-Sweden and China-Ghana BITs adopt a
radically different definition of "investor" as it relates to the Chinese side.
The China-Sweden BIT defines a Chinese investor as "any company, other
legal person or citizen of China authorized by the Chinese Government to
make an investment."2 5 The China-Ghana BIT, however, contains no
requirement for government authorization. 2 6 It protects Chinese invest-
ment in Ghana by any Chinese nationals or legal entities established under
the laws of China.2 7 The government authorization requirement in the
China-Sweden BIT is both curious and uncommon. It limits protection
only to those authorized by the Chinese Government to invest in Sweden.
Chinese nationals or legal persons who invest in Ghana on the other hand,
would benefit from the protection of the BIT regardless of prior authoriza-
tion to invest in Ghana. The reason for the limited protection to those with
government authorization is unclear. In any case, it appears that Sweden is
one of the preferred European destinations for Chinese investment.28
With respect to the treatment of investment, both BITs provide for fair
and equitable treatment and most favored nation (MFN) treatment, but
they differ on the exceptions. While the China-Sweden BIT excepts Free
Trade Areas (FTAs), Customs Unions (CUs), as well as preexisting privi-
leges, the China-Ghana BIT excepts only FTAs and CUs. 2 9
The next important substantive prescription relates to expropriation.
The China-Sweden BIT appears more traditional. It provides:
(1) Neither Contracting State shall expropriate or nationalize, or take any
other similar measure in regard to, an investment made in its territory by an
investor of the other Contracting State, except in the public interest, under
due process of law and against compensation, the purpose of which shall be
to place the investor in the same financial position as that in which the inves-
tor would have been if the expropriation or nationalization had not taken
23. Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments, China-Swed., Mar. 29,
1983, 1350 U.N.T.S. 256 [hereinafter China-Sweden BIT].
24. KIDANE, supra note 2, at 136-37.
25. China-Sweden BIT, supra note 23, at art. 1(2).
26. See Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, China-Ghana, Oct. 12, 1989 [hereinafter China-Ghana BIT].
27. See id. at art. 1(b).
28. Countries that have a structured approach to Chinese investors, such as Ger-
many, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, have been successful in attracting investment.
This is amplified when the host country has a large market, and has resulted in the
concentration of foreign direct investment in a few leading European Union Member
States. See JEREMY CLEGG & HINRICH Voss, EUROPE CHINA RESEARCH AND ADVICE NET-
WORK, CHINESE OVERSEAS DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2009), https://
www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Asia/0912ecran_
cleggvoss.pdf.
29. See China-Sweden BIT, supra note 23; China-Ghana BIT, supra note 26, at art. 3.
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place. The expropriation or nationalization shall not be discriminatory and
the compensation shall be paid without unreasonable delay and shall be
convertible and freely transferable between the territories of the Contracting
States.
(2) The provisions of paragraph (1) shall also apply to the current income
from an investment as well as, in the event of liquidation, to the proceeds
from the liquidation.3 0
Some of the basic principles are clear, such as the principle of non-discrim-
ination for public purpose under due process of law, and what is presuma-
bly a requirement of adequate compensation, stated in nontraditional
terms.
The formulation under the China-Ghana BIT is slightly different.
First, it begins by permitting expropriation only for a public purpose. In
other words, it does not make it the exception. It reads:
Either contracting state may, for the national security or public interest
expropriate, nationalize or take similar measures (hereinafter referred to as
"expropriation") against investment of investors of the other Contracting
State in its territory, but subject to the following conditions:
(a) Under domestic legal procedure
(b) Without discrimination. 3 1
In addition to the different formulations, this provision adds national
security as a ground for expropriation. The validity of the expropriation is
tested against domestic legal procedures, but substantively the only limita-
tion seems to be the absence of discrimination.
These substantive provisions are sufficient to conclude that the China-
Sweden and China-Ghana BITs, which basically fall under the first genera-
tion Chinese BITs, do not suggest any logical North-South or South-South 32
pattern. If anything, it appears that the China-Ghana BIT may be less pro-
tective than the China-Sweden BIT. This, in turn, indicates that China may
not have pursued a systematic BIT policy under preconceived BIT models
in the way the United States has. This suggestion, and the possibility that
it continues to this day, will be explored further throughout this Article in
relation to subsequent periods.
The most notable difference between the China-Sweden and China-
Ghana BITs relates to dispute settlement. While both contain a similar pro-
vision on the settlement of disputes between the contracting parties, only
the China-Ghana BIT contains a provision on the resolution of disputes
between an investor from one contracting state and the other contracting
30. See China-Sweden BIT, supra note 23, at art. 3.
31. See China-Ghana BIT, supra note 26, at art. 4.
32. In development discourse and throughout this Article, "North" refers to devel-
oped countries and "South" refers to developing countries. All African countries and
China are considered developing countries of the South. See e.g., U.N. Conference on
Trade & Development, Economic Development in Africa Report 2010: South-South Cooper-
ation-Africa and the New Forms of Development Partnership, 24-25, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/ALDC/AFRICA/2010, U.N. Sales No. E.10.I.D.13 (June 18, 2010), http://
unctad.org/en/Docs/aldcafrica20l 0en.pdf.
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state.3 3 Even that provision is limited to granting access to international
arbitration to the investor of one contracting state in the other on the quan-
tum of compensation for expropriation.3 4 The particular international
arbitration that the BIT allows is ad hoc with the default appointing author-
ity residing in the Chairman of the International Arbitration Institute of the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.3 5 The BIT gives the arbitral tribunal
the authority to adopt its own procedural rules with due reference to the
Rules of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID). 3 6 It selects the substantive laws of the respondent state and gen-
eral principles of international law recognized by both parties as the rules
of decision.37
It is quite remarkable, perhaps even ironic, that the China-Sweden BIT,
which is presumably still valid, does not contain an investor state dispute
resolution provision, while the China-Ghana BIT selects the International
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce as the
appointing authority. A possible explanation for that difference relates to
the fact that the China-Ghana BIT, a first generation BIT that came into
force in October 1989, is temporally closer to the second generation BITs of
the 1990s than the China-Sweden BIT that took effect in March 1982.
B. Chinese BITs in the 1990s
Chinese BITs that are considered second generation BITs are those
signed between 1992 and 2000.38 This generation of BITs also has certain
defining characteristics. Interestingly, China signed no BITs with devel-
oped economies of the Global North during this period, with the exception
of Greece and Iceland, but did sign many BITs with developing economies
in South Asia and Africa.39 A look at the China-Egypt and China-Iceland
BITs is useful to highlight the defining features of the second generation
Chinese BITs, and puts them in the South-South and North-South context.
The definitions of investment offered by these BITs do not substan-
tially differ from one another, or from those found in the first generation of
BITs. They do, however, contain slight variations in the way that the term
"claims to money" is defined. In the China-Egypt BIT, the definition reads:
"claims to money or to any other performance under contract having eco-
nomic value associated with investment." 4 0 The China-Iceland BIT defines
it as: "returns reinvested or claims to money or to any performance having
33. China-Ghana BIT, supra note 26, at art. 10(1).
34. Id.
35. Id. at art. 10(3).
36. Id.
37. Id. at art. 10(5).
38. See GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 7, at 419.
39. See China- International Investment Agreements, supra note 22.
40. Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ments, China-Egypt, art. 1(1)(c), Apr. 21, 1994 [hereinafter China-Egypt BIT], http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/730.
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financial value."4 1 As indicated above, some contemporary treaties like
NAFTA exclude claims to money unassociated with investment from pro-
tection. Similarly, the China-Egypt treaty appears to follow that trend,
while the China-Iceland treaty makes no such restriction. As to the defini-
tion of investor, both treaties protect the investments of natural persons
who are citizens of the contracting states, as well as their juridical entities.
The only difference is that the China-Egypt BIT requires juridical persons
of the contracting states to be domiciliaries of the relevant contracting
party to receive the privileges of the treaty.4 2 The China-Iceland BIT
imposes no such condition.4 3
As far as the treatment of investment is concerned, while both accord
fair and equitable and MFN treatment, the China-Iceland BIT adds what
could be termed an optional or quasi-national treatment provision. It reads
in pertinent part:
In addition to the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this [fair and equita-
ble treatment Article] either Contracting Party shall, to the extent possible,
accord treatment in accordance with the stipulations of its laws and regula-
tions, to the investments of the investors of the other Contracting Party the
same as that accorded to its own investor.4 4
Although the expropriation provisions are stated quite differently, the
substantive prescriptions are more or less the same.45 Expropriation must
be for public purpose, accord due process, and the investor must be offered
reasonable compensation without unreasonable delay. 46 The China-Ice-
land BIT, however, allows for a domestic review process not present in the
China-Egypt BIT. 47 Overall, though, the differences are unremarkable.4 8
Substantively, the only significant difference between the Chinese BITs
of the 1980s and the 1990s appears to be the move towards according con-
ditional or optional National Treatment in some instances, as exemplified
by the China-Iceland BIT. The greatest difference relates to the dispute set-
tlement provisions. It is important to note that China had signed the ICSID
Convention by February 1990 although it did not ratify it until January 7,
1993.49 As discussed above, some of the 1980s BITs make reference to
41. Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
China-Ice., art. 1(3)(c), Mar. 31, 1994 [hereinafter China-Iceland BIT], http://invest-
mentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/741.
42. China-Egypt BIT, supra note 40, at art. 1(2)(b).
43. China-Iceland BIT, supra note 41, at art. 1(2).
44. Id. at art. 3(3).
45. Compare China-Egypt BIT, supra note 40, at art. 4, with China-Iceland BIT, supra
note 41, at art. 4.
46. China-Egypt BIT, supra note 40, at art. 4.
47. China-Iceland BIT, supra note 41, at art. 4.
48. Compare China-Egypt BIT, supra note 40, at art. 4, with China-Iceland BIT, supra
note 41, at art. 4(3)(c).
49. INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INv. DisPuTEs, LisT OF CONTRACTING STATES AND
OTHER SIGNATORIES TO THE CONVENTION (2015), https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSID
WEB/icsiddocs/Documents/List%200f%2OContracting%2OStates%20and%200ther%
20Signatories%20of%20the%20Convention%20-%20Latest.pdf (last visited Apr. 8,
2016).
148 Vol. 49
2016 China's Bilateral Investment Treaties with African States
ICSID, but only in relation to the use of its rules of procedure as guidance
for ad hoc tribunals authorized to adopt their own rules of procedure.50
The 1990s BITs, as exemplified by the China-Egypt and China-Iceland BITs,
contain a more prominent mention of ICSID. For example, while the prin-
cipal dispute settlement mechanism that the China-Egypt BIT contains is
court litigation,5 ' it also allows the investor to submit a claim on the quan-
tum of compensation to ad hoc arbitration. 52 It also gives the Secretary
General of ICSID the default authority to appoint the chair of the tribu-
nal.5 3 The China-Iceland BIT gives ICSID further prominence: it allows
either party to submit a claim on the quantum of compensation to ad hoc
or ICSID arbitration at the choice of the moving party.5 4 This is in addi-
tion to the reference to ICSID as the default appointing authority and
ICSID procedural rules as a guidance.55 Similar to the 1980s BITs, Chinese
BITs from the 1990s do not demonstrate any discernable China-North or
China-South patterns, apart from being primarily China-South BITs. To
the extent there are any differences, they are quite unremarkable.
C. Chinese BITs in the 2000s
The third generation Chinese BITs are those signed in the 2000s. Con-
tinuing the same methodology as above, one China-North and one China-
South are profiled below. These are China-Germany (2003) and China-
Uganda (2004), respectively. The definition of investment in both is
almost identical. It requires that claims to money be associated with invest-
ment.56 The definition of investor is also identical: nationals and juridical
persons of the respective country.57
The two BITs also state the required treatment for investments made
by the other contracting nation's investors in almost identical terms as
follows:
Treatment of Investment
(1) Investments of investors of each Contracting Party shall at all times be
accorded fair and equitable treatment in the territory of the other Con-
tracting Party.
(2) Each Contracting Party shall accord to investments and activities associ-
ated with such investments by the investors of the other Contracting Party
treatment not less favourable than that accorded to the investments and
associated activities by its own investors.
50. See, e.g., China-Ghana BIT, supra note 26, at art. 10(3).
51. Id. at art. 9(2).
52. Id. at art. 9(3).
53. Id. at art. 9(4).
54. China-Iceland BIT, supra note 41, at art. 9(3).
55. See id. at art. 9(6).
56. Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
China-Ger., art. 1(1)(c), Dec. 1, 2003, 2362 U.N.T.S. 253 [hereinafter China-Germany
BIT]; Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-
Uganda, art. 1(1)(c), May 27, 2004 [hereinafter China-Uganda BIT], http://invest-
mentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/790.
57. China-Germany BIT, supra note 56, at art. 1(2); China-Uganda BIT, supra note
56, at art. 1(2).
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(3) Neither Contracting Party shall subject investments and activities associ-
ated with such investments by the investors of the other Contracting Party to
treatment less favourable than that accorded to the investments and associ-
ated activities by the investors of any third State.
(4) The provisions of Paragraphs 1 to 3 of this Article shall not be construed
so as to oblige one Contracting Party to extend to the investors of the other
Contracting Party the benefit of any treatment, preference or privilege by
virtue of
(a) any membership or association with any existing or future customs
union, free trade zone, economic union, common market;
(b) any double taxation agreement or other agreement regarding mat-
ters of taxation.58
The treatment of investment provisions, along with the dispute settlement
provision discussed below, is the hallmark of the third generation Chinese
BIT. It officially and expressly grants National Treatment on top of MFN.
This provision reciprocally benefits all four beneficiaries in exactly the
same way: German investors in China, Chinese investors in Germany,
Ugandan investors in China, and Chinese investors in Uganda. In practice,
there are Chinese investors in Germany and German investors in China.
There are also Chinese investors in Uganda, but few if any Ugandan inves-
tors in China. The critical inquiry thus continues to be whether the pau-
city of African investment interests in China has dictated qualitative
differences anywhere in the three generations of Chinese BIT models. This
question will be explored further.
The expropriation provision is also almost identical. It prohibits the
expropriation of the investments of investors unless for public purpose and
without discrimination, and expressly outlines the Hull Rule5 9 of prompt,
effective, and adequate compensation.6 0 Although there were traces of this
58. China-Germany BIT, supra note 56, at art. 3. See also China-Uganda BIT, supra
note 56, at art. 3 (containing slight, inconsequential phraseological variation on the
exceptions).
59. See Frank G. Dawson & Burns H. Weston, "Prompt, Adequate, and Effective": A
Universal Standard of Compensation?, 30 FORDHAM L. REv. 727, 733-34 (1962).
60. China-Germany BIT, supra note 56, at art. 4:
Expropriation and Compensation
(1) Investments by investors of either Contracting Party shall enjoy full protec-
tion and security in the territory of the other Contracting Party.
(2) Investments by investors of either Contracting Party shall not directly or
indirectly be expropriated, nationalized or subjected to any other measure the
effects of which would be tantamount to expropriation or nationalization in the
territory of the other Contracting Party (hereinafter referred to as expropriation)
except for the public benefit and against compensation. Such compensation
shall be equivalent to the value of the investment immediately before the expro-
priation is taken or the threatening expropriation has become publicly known,
whichever is earlier. The compensation shall be paid without delay and shall
carry interest at the prevailing commercial rate until the time of payment; it
shall be effectively realizable and freely transferable. Precautions shall have
been made in an appropriate manner at or prior to the time of expropriation for
the determination and payment of such compensation. At the request of the
investor the legality of any such expropriation and the amount of compensation
shall be subject to review by national courts, notwithstanding the provisions of
Article 9.
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rule in prior generations, the third generation BITs outline the rule more
precisely. There are no notable differences in the way that the Hull Rule is
stated in the China-Germany and China-Uganda BITs except the addition
of MFN in the China-Germany BIT in relation to expropriation. 6 1 The
addition of MFN in the expropriation provision appears unusual, given the
general lack of a coherent strategy in China's BITs.
Dispute settlement is another area where the third generation makes a
notable change from the previous generation because it provides investors
access to ICSID arbitration. Interestingly, the China-Germany and China-
Uganda BITs contain differing formulations. Comparing the texts is use-
ful. The dispute settlement provision of the China-Germany BIT states in
whole:
Settlement of Disputes between Investors and one Contracting Party
(1) Any dispute concerning investments between a Contracting Party and
an investor of the other Contracting Party should as far as possible be settled
amicably between the parties in dispute.
(2) If the dispute cannot be settled within six months of the date when it
has been raised by one of the parties in dispute, it shall, at the request of the
investor of the other Contracting State, be submitted for arbitration.
(3) The dispute shall be submitted for arbitration under the Convention of
18 March 1965 on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States (ICSID), unless the parties in dispute agree on an
ad-hoc arbitral tribunal to be established under the Arbitration Rules of the
United Nations Commission on the International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
or other arbitration rules.
(4) Any award by an ad-hoc tribunal shall be final and binding. Any award
under the procedures of the said Convention shall be binding and subject
only to those appeals or remedies provided for in this Convention. The
awards shall be enforced in accordance with domestic law.6 2
The China-Uganda BIT put it this way:
Settlement of disputes between an investor and a Contracting Party
(3) Investors of either Contracting Party shall enjoy most-favoured-nation treat-
ment in the territory of the other Contracting Party in respect of the matters
provided for in this Article.
61. See China-Uganda BIT, supra note 56, at art. 4:
Expropriation
1. Neither Contracting Party shall take any measures of expropriation or
nationalization or any other measures having the effect of dispossession, direct
or indirect, of investors of the other Contracting Party of their investments in
territory, except for the public interest, without discrimination and against
compensation.
2. Any measures of dispossession which might be taken shall give rise to
prompt compensation, the amount of which shall be equivalent to the real value
of the investments immediately before the expropriation is taken or the impend-
ing expropriation becomes public knowledge, whichever is earlier.
3. The said compensation shall be set not later than the date of dispossession.
The compensation shall include interest at a normal commercial rate from the
date of expropriation until the date of payment. The compensation shall also be
made without delay, be effectively realizable and freely transferable.
62. China-Germany BIT, supra note 56, at art. 9.
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1. Any legal dispute between an investor of one Contracting Party and the
other Contracting Party in connection with an investment in the territory of
the other Contracting Party shall, as far as possible, be settled amicably
through negotiations between the parties to the dispute.
2. If the dispute cannot be settled through negotiations within six months
from the date it has been raised by either party to the dispute, it shall be
submitted by the choice of the investor:
(a) to the competent court of the Contracting Party that is a party to the
dispute;
(b) to International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
under the Convention on the Settlement of Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, done at Washington on March 18, 1965, pro-
vided that the Contracting Party involved in the dispute may require the
investor concerned to go through the domestic administrative review pro-
cedures specified by the laws and regulations of that Contracting Party
before the submission to the ICSID. Once the investor has submitted the
dispute to the competent court of the Contracting Party concerned or to
the ICSID, the choice of one of the two procedures shall be final.
3. The arbitration award shall be based on the law of the Contracting Party
to the dispute including its rules on the conflict of laws the provisions of this
Agreement as well as the universally accepted principles of international
law.
4. The arbitration award shall be final and binding upon both parties to the
dispute. Both Contracting Parties shall commit themselves to the enforce-
ment of the award. Each party to the dispute shall bear the costs of its
appointed arbitrator and of its representation in arbitral proceedings. The
relevant costs of the Chairman and tribunal shall be borne in equal parts by
the parties to the dispute. The tribunal may in its award direct that a higher
proportion of the costs be borne by one of the parties to the dispute.63
The default rule under the China-Germany BIT is ICSID arbitration unless
both parties agree to resort to ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL
Rules. 6 4 The China-Uganda BIT gives the investor more options including
resort to domestic court litigation in the host country or ICSID arbitration,
but it also allows the host state to require the investor to exhaust domestic
administrative remedies.6 5 Theoretically, under the ICSID Convention, the
exhaustion of local administrative remedies may be interpreted as a condi-
tion on the consent provided by the BIT to subject the host state to the
jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals. In any case, such a requirement is a signifi-
cant impediment to accessing the ICSID arbitration system. The China-
Uganda BIT also makes no other provision for UNCITRAL or other ad hoc
arbitration.
It is remarkable that while China (at least at the time the China-Ger-
many BIT was signed) was principally the recipient of investment and
would theoretically have more incentives to limit the investor's choices on
international procedural remedies, and seek expansive international proce-
dural remedies vis-A-vis Uganda in which it is investor not recipient, the
dispute settlement provisions in the respective BITs appear to be informed
63. China-Uganda BIT, supra note 56, at art. 8.
64. China-Germany BIT, supra note 56, at art. 9(3).
65. China-Uganda BIT, supra note 56, at art. 8(2).
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by the opposite theoretical assumptions. This may not be a result of well
thought out and systematic policy on the part of China, or it may be that
China, unlike many developed economies, was not overly concerned about
the availability of international procedural remedies for its investors during
the time period that it signed the third generation BITs. The next Part
explores the salient features of the most contemporary Chinese BITs to see
if China is increasingly acting like the more mature and developed econo-
mies of the North, or if it is developing its own formulations custom-made
for its various needs and interests.
II. The Salient Features of the Contemporary Chinese BITs
The China-Canada BIT is selected for analysis, not only because it is
the most contemporary Chinese BIT, but also because it provides perspec-
tive on China's approach to investment protection vis-A-vis the developed
economies of the North. The analysis also shows how the China-Canada
BIT informs or should inform its approach to investment protection in
Africa. The China-Tanzania BIT (March 2013) is selected simply because it
is the latest China-Africa BIT signed. It was signed within months of the
China-Canada BIT (signed September 2012), making them the same
generation. 6 6
A. The China-Canada BIT
The China-Canada BIT came into force on October 1, 2014.67 As of
this writing, it is the most recent Chinese BIT with demonstrably more
contemporary features. Just on its face, the China-Canada BIT is signifi-
cantly longer, with thirty-five articles and many annexes covering many
more substantive areas than the previous Chinese BIT models, and includ-
ing an extraordinary level of detail on the subject of dispute settlement.6 8
1. Substantive Rights and Obligations
Protected investment is defined more broadly than in the previous
model BITs. In fact, the definition resembles the definition contained in
NAFTA Chapter 11 to the point where it could be concluded that it was
clearly informed by the NAFTA definition, if not completely taken verba-
tim. It reads:
For the purpose of this Agreement,
1. "investment" means:
(a) an enterprise;
(b) shares, stocks and other forms of equity participation in an enterprise;
66. See International Investment Agreements Navigator: China, INv. POL'Y HUB (Nov. 2,
2015), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/42#iialnnerMenu
(showing signature status).
67. See id.
68. See Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
People's Republic of China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Can.-China, Sept. 9, 2012 [hereinafter China-Canada BIT], http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3476.
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(c) bonds, debentures, and other debt instruments of an enterprise;
(d) a loan to an enterprise
(i) where the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or
(ii) where the original maturity of the loan is at least three years;
(e) notwithstanding sub-paragraphs (c) and (d) above, a loan to or debt
security issued by a financial institution is an investment only where the
loan or debt security is treated as regulatory capital by the Contracting Party
in whose territory the financial institution is located;
(f) an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in the income
or profits of the enterprise;
(g) an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in the assets
of that enterprise on dissolution;
(h) interests arising from the commitment of capital or other resources in
the territory of a Contracting Party to economic activity in such territory,
such as under
(i) contracts involving the presence of an investor's property in the terri-
tory of the Contracting Party, including turnkey or construction con-
tracts, or concessions to search for and extract oil and other natural
resources, or
(ii) contracts where remuneration depends substantially on the produc-
tion, revenue or profits of an enterprise;
(i) intellectual property rights; and
(j) any other tangible or intangible, moveable or immovable, property and
related property rights acquired or used for business purposes.69
69. Compare id. at art. 1(1), with North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-
U.S., ch. 11, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA] (defining invest-
ment as:
(a) an enterprise;
(b) an equity security of an enterprise;
(c) a debt security of an enterprise
(i) where the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or
(ii) where the original maturity of the debt security is at least three years,
but does not include a debt security, regardless of original maturity, of a state
enterprise;
(d) a loan to an enterprise
(i) where the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or
(ii) where the original maturity of the loan is at least three years,
but does not include a loan, regardless of original maturity, to a state enterprise;
(e) an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in income or
profits of the enterprise;
(f) an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in the assets of
that enterprise on dissolution, other than a debt security or a loan excluded
from subparagraph (c) or (d);
(g) real estate or other property, tangible or intangible, acquired in the expecta-
tion or used for the purpose of economic benefit or other business purposes;
and
(h) interests arising from the commitment of capital or other resources in the
territory of a Party to economic activity in such territory, such as under
(i) contracts involving the presence of an investor's property in the territory of
the Party, including turnkey or construction contracts, or concessions, or
(ii) contracts where remuneration depends substantially on the production, rev-
enues or profits of an enterprise;
but investment does not mean,
(i) claims to money that arise solely from
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This definition, apart from elaborating what constitutes investment, also
expresses what does not constitute investment, namely,
claims to money that arise solely from
(i) commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services, or
(ii) the extension of credit in connection with a commercial transaction,
such as trade financing, other than a loan covered by sub-paragraph (d); or
(1) any other claims to money, that do not involve the kinds of interests set
out in sub-paragraphs (a) to (j). 7 0
This definition of investment is basically an elaboration of the notion con-
tained in the previous BIT models that links a claim to money to invest-
ment. This elaboration, informed by cases and controversies that arose out
of models in North America, does not seem to make the kind of difference
that the addition of so much text would otherwise suggest. In any case, the
definition is clearly not one that China has used in any Africa BITs. It will
be interesting to see if the same definition is used in the highly anticipated
China-U.S. BIT.
The term "investor" is also defined better than in the previous models.
It includes not only citizens but also permanent residents of the con-
tracting parties.7 1 This is particularly important to Canada where the for-
eign-born population with permanent residency status is very high.7 2 The
definition excludes those who may have the citizenship of the other con-
tracting state.73 In other words, dual nationals of the parties would not be
considered investors, but interestingly, an investor of one who has perma-
nent residency of the other would be considered an investor for purposes
of the BIT. An example of this would be a Chinese citizen who has perma-
nent residence status in Canada. He would be considered an investor
within the meaning of the BIT and will be entitled to all the protections to
the extent that his permanent residency does not accord better rights. The
exclusion of dual citizens from the protection regime would seem to deny
rare benefits or incentives to citizens that the host country might wish to
accord to foreign investors. This is also not a very common formulation in
any of the other Chinese BITs.
(i) commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services by a national or enter-
prise in the territory of a Party to an enterprise in the territory of another Party,
or
(ii) the extension of credit in connection with a commercial transaction, such as
trade financing, other than a loan covered by subparagraph (d); or
(j) any other claims to money,
that do not involve the kinds of interests set out in subparagraphs (a) through
(h) .... .).
70. China-Canada BIT, supra note 68, at art. 1(1).
71. Id. at art. 1(2).
72. See id. The definition reads in particular:
"[1]nvestor" means with regard to either Contracting Party:
(a) any natural person who has the citizenship or status of permanent resident
of that Contracting Party in accordance with its laws and who does not possess
the citizenship of the other Contracting Party; (b) any enterprise as defined in
paragraph 10(a) of this Article; that seeks to make, is making or has made a
covered investment.
73. See id.
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A notable provision that the China-Canada BIT adds is a brief provi-
sion on admission.74 Given the importance of admission decisions, the
provision that the contracting parties decided to insert is quite remarkable
in its brevity. It reads: "Each Contracting Party shall encourage investors of
the other Contracting Party to make investments in its territory and admit
such investments in accordance with its laws, regulations and rules."75 It
is clear from this provision that the contacting parties could not agree on a
common standard of admission, but its inclusion perhaps serves as a place
holder for future compromises on the perpetually contentious issue of
admission. This has been the case since the first generation BIT. 76
The China-Canada BIT also includes a separate provision for fair and
equitable treatment, linking it to international law and, in particular, state
practice.77 Given the contentious nature of the specific standards under
customary international law, the parties' decision to word it so simply is
indicative of the difficulty of agreeing on more concrete standards even
with growing maturity of the jurisprudence in this area.
Fundamental principles such as fair and equitable treatment, MFN,
and National Treatment (ordinarily merged into one or two paragraphs in
the previous model BITs) are elaborated in separate provisions in the
China-Canada BIT. The fair and equitable provision cited above is con-
tained in an article titled Minimum Standard of Treatment.7 8 The previous
models link MFN to fair and equitable treatment-in other words, mini-
mum treatment.7 9 The provision in this BIT goes a little further and
accords benefits of its own. It reads in full:
1. Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of the other Contracting
Party treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like circum-
stances, to investors of a non-Contracting Party with respect to the establish-
ment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or
other disposition of investments in its territory.
2. Each Contracting Party shall accord to covered investments treatment no
less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investments of
investors of a non-Contracting Party with respect to the establishment,
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other
disposition of investments in its territory.
74. Id. at art. 3.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., China-Ghana BIT, supra note 26, at art. 3.
77. China-Canada BIT, supra note 68, at art. 4. It reads in full:
1. Each Contracting Party shall accord to covered investments fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security, in accordance with international law.
2. The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and secur-
ity" in paragraph I do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which
is required by the international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as
evidenced by general State practice accepted as law.
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of this
Agreement, or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that
there has been a breach of this Article.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., China-Ghana BIT, supra note 26, at art. 3.
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3. For greater certainty, the "treatment" referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
this Article does not encompass the dispute resolution mechanisms, such as
those in Part C, in other international investment treaties and other trade
agreements.8 0
This provision states the obligations in more precise terms as including
treatment in respect of establishment and conduct in general. As indicated
above, the previous generations linked MFN to the minimum standards of
treatment. 1 It is also remarkable that the MFN provision expressly
excluded the dispute settlement provision.8 2 This is clearly informed by
recent arguments about whether dispute settlement provisions would be
imputed on the basis of MFN.8 3 That argument never gained popularity
but was one that needed to be addressed on a case-by-case basis, and evi-
dently China and Canada decided to err on the side of expressly excluding
it. This makes sense given the visible effort that they have made to custom-
ize the dispute settlement provision (discussed below) to their own specific
needs.
The National Treatment provision is also notable for its clarity. It
states:
1. Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of the other Contracting
Party treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like circum-
stances, to its own investors with respect to the expansion, management,
conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of investments in its
territory.
2. Each Contracting Party shall accord to covered investments treatment no
less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investments of
its own investors with respect to the expansion, management, conduct, oper-
ation and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory.
3. The concept of "expansion" in this Article applies only with respect to
sectors not subject to a prior approval process under the relevant sectoral
guidelines and applicable laws, regulations and rules in force at the time of
expansion. The expansion may be subject to prescribed formalities and
other information requirements.8 4
Note specifically the express statement regarding the permissibility of pre-
scribing formalities and information requirements-measures that could
be confused with regulatory restrictions that may infringe upon the sub-
stantive rights granted to the investor under the BIT.
In addition to elaborating and clarifying the abovementioned standard
substantive provisions, the China-Canada BIT contains some new substan-
tive provisions. Their coverage ranges from details such as nationality
requirements in executive and board positions, to immigration regula-
tions.8 5 Some of these are important details that the previous BIT models
80. China-Canada BIT, supra note 68, at art. 5.
81. See, e.g., China-Ghana BIT, supra note 26, at art. 3.
82. China-Canada BIT, supra note 68, at art. 5(3).
83. See Nartnirun Junngam, An MFN Clause and BIT Dispute Settlement: A Host
State's Implied Consent to Arbitration by Reference, 15 UCLAJ. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF.
399, 408 (2010).
84. China-Canada BIT, supra note 68, at art. 6.
85. For example, Article 7(3) states:
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did not contain. In terms of performance requirements, the China-Canada
BIT incorporates the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on
Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) by reference.8 6 This not only
ensures WTO compatibility, but also subjects the parties to already agreed
upon and familiar rules on investment, no matter how sporadic.
The expropriation provision is almost identical to the expropriation
provision found in third generation BITs.8 7 It incorporates the Hull Rule
on compensation without going into the details of how valuation should be
conducted. It thus preserves the old rule and does not shed any additional
light. In effect, if a controversy arises with respect to an expropriated
investment, this BIT provides no better guidance than the previous models,
which is somewhat surprising. On measures of expropriation, however,
the parties have agreed to add an indeterminate provision at the end regis-
tering their common understanding on what might constitute an indirect
expropriation.88 This addition is as much an expression of their willing-
ness to demur on difficult questions as it is of their inability to agree on a
definition of indirect expropriation.
The China-Canada BIT contains detailed provisions on subrogation,8 9
transfers,9 0 taxation,9 1 denial of benefits, 92 transparency of laws and regu-
lations,9 3 and dispute settlement.9 4 The dispute settlement provision is
discussed in some detail below. Before addressing that, however, it is
important to highlight the denial of benefits provision because such a pro-
vision does not typically feature in Chinese BITs. It reads in full:
1. A Contracting Party may, at any time including after the institution of
arbitration proceedings in accordance with Part C, deny the benefits of this
Agreement to an investor of the other Contracting Party that is an enterprise
of that other Contracting Party and to covered investments of that investor:
(a) if investors of a non-Contracting Party own or control the enterprise; and
(b) the denying Contracting Party adopts or maintains measures with
respect to the non-Contracting Party:
Subject to its laws, regulations and policies relating to the entry and sojourn of
non-citizens, a Contracting Party shall permit natural persons who have the citi-
zenship or status of permanent resident of the other Contracting Party and are
employed by any enterprise that is a covered investment of an investor, or a
subsidiary or affiliate thereof, to enter and remain temporarily in its territory in
a capacity that is managerial, executive or that requires specialized knowledge.
China-Canada BIT, supra note 68, at art. 7(3).
86. Id. at art. 9 ("The Contracting Parties reaffirm their obligations under the WTO
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), as amended from time to time.
Article 2 and the Annex of the TRIMs are incorporated into and made part of this
Agreement.").
87. Compare China-Germany BIT, supra note 56, at art. 4(2) (illustrating the expro-
priation provision of a third generation BIT), with China-Canada BIT, supra note 68, at
art. 10(1) (illustrating the contemporary BIT expropriation provision).
88. See China-Canada BIT, supra note 68, at Annex B.10(2).
89. Id. at art. 13.
90. Id. at art. 12.
91. Id. at art. 14.
92. Id. at art. 16.
93. Id. at art. 17.
94. Id. at art. 19-32.
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§(i) that prohibit transactions with the enterprise; or
§(ii) that would be violated or circumvented if the benefits of this Agree-
ment were accorded to the enterprise or to its covered investments.
2. A Contracting Party may, at any time including after the institution of
arbitration proceedings in accordance with Part C, deny the benefits of this
Agreement to an investor of the other Contracting Party that is an enterprise
of that other Contracting Party and to covered investments of that investor if
investors of a non-Contracting Party or of the denying Contracting Party
own or control the enterprise and the enterprise has no substantial business
activities in the territory of the other Contracting Party under whose law it is
constituted or organized.
3. For greater certainty, a Contracting Party may deny the benefits of this
Agreement pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 at any time, including after the
initiation of arbitration proceedings in accordance with Part C. 9 5
The benefits rule appears to be analogous to the origin rule in trade and is
designed to prevent investors of non-contracting states from misusing the
BIT's benefits through arrangements that circumvent the eligibility require-
ments. The rule can even deny benefits after the commencement of arbitral
proceedings. This provision is a new addition in any Chinese BIT and is
likely to be a source of dispute, much like the fair and equitable provision
of most BITs, because of the increasing complexity and usage of corporate
shells around the world.
2. Dispute Settlement
By far the most significant change that the China-Canada BIT
introduces pertains to the unusually elaborate investor-state dispute settle-
ment provision.9 6 It not only commits the parties to arbitrate in very spe-
cific ways under very specific procedures.9 7 The dispute settlement
provision comprises Articles 19 through 32,98 and covers almost all
aspects of the process in unusual detail, down to rules of procedure.
The first noteworthy aspect of the provision is that it sets up a unique
dispute settlement mechanism for the financial sector embedded within the
main dispute settlement mechanism.9 9 The mechanism is international
arbitration under ICSID Rules or ICSID Additional Facilities, or UNCI-
TRAL Rules as modified by the BIT rules.10 0 The inclusion of the Addi-
tional Facilities has, of course, become redundant by virtue of Canada's
ratification of the ICSID Convention on December 1, 2013.101 That the
China-Canada BIT was signed before Canada's ratification of the ICSID
95. Id. at art. 16.
96. Id. at art. 19-32.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at art. 22.
100. Id. at art. 22(1)(a)-(c).
101. INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INv. DispuTEs, LIST OF CONTRACTING STATES AND
OTHER SIGNATORIES OF THE CONVENTION (2015), https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSID
WEB/icsiddocs/Documents/List%200f%2OContracting%2OStates%20and%200ther%
20Signatories%20of%20the%20Convention%20-%2OLatest.pdf [last visited Apr. 8,
2016]. China ratified the Convention on January 7, 1993.
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Convention explains the redundancy and even suggests that Canada was
unsure about ratifying the ICSID Convention until at least the signing of
the BIT on September 12, 2012.
In any case, the choice of whether to submit a claim for arbitration
and under what rules remains that of the investor. 102 This BIT, though
contemporary, does not depart from the traditional rule that the investor
may initiate arbitration while the host state may not.103 Certain models,
such as the investment treaty model of the International Institute for Sus-
tainable Development (IISD), a Canadian non-governmental organization,
provide for the host state's right to proceed against the investor for the
investor's breach of its obligations in arbitration.104 The IISD Model
defines the investor's obligations in great detail in separate provisions.' 05
As a contemporary agreement, the China-Canada BIT could have been
expected to contain at least some of these investor responsibility provi-
sions, but evidently the parties either could not agree on the principles or
did not see the need to add such provisions to this BIT.
Be that as it may, the new mechanism relative to the financial sector is
significant. It combines state-to-state arbitration with investor-state arbitra-
tion whereby proceedings of one inform or even control the other.106
When the subject matter of the dispute pertains to reasonable measures
that one of the parties has taken relative to the following items, the state
may raise a defense against an investor's claims on the basis of these
measures:1 07
102. See China-Canada BIT, supra note 68, at art. 22(1).
103. See id. at art. 20-23.
104. See HowARD MANN ET AL., INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEv., IISD MODEL INTERNA-
TIONAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, at Annex A, art. 2(1)
(2005), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment-model-int-agreement.pdf. It reads:
(1) In the event that a disputing party considers that a dispute cannot be settled
by alternative means, and all other pre-conditions for such a dispute as required
by the Agreement have been fulfilled:
a) the investment, on its own behalf, may submit to arbitration under this
Agreement a claim that the respondent host State has breached an obligation
under this Agreement and that the investment has incurred loss or damage by
reason of, or arising out of, that breach;
b) the investor, on its own or on behalf of the investment if it is the controlling
investor, may submit to arbitration under this Agreement a claim that the
respondent has breached an obligation under this Agreement, and that the
claimant has incurred loss or damage by reason of, or arising out of, that
breach;
c) a State Party may submit a claim to arbitration under this Agreement as
claimant against another State party; and
d) a State Party may submit a claim to arbitration as claimant against an inves-
tor or investment.
105. See id. at art. 11-18 (Obligations of Investors and Investments -Article 11: Gen-
eral obligations; Article 12: Pre-establishment impact assessment; Article 13: Anti-cor-
ruption; Article 14: Post-establishment obligations; Article 15: Corporate governance
and practices; Article 16: Corporate social responsibility; Article 17: Investor liability;
Article 18: Relation of this Part to dispute settlement).
106. See China-Canada BIT, supra note 68, at art. 20(2)(a)-(c).
107. Id.
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(a) the protection of depositors, financial market participants and investors,
policyholders, policy-claimants, or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is
owed by a financial institution;
(b) the maintenance of the safety, soundness, integrity or financial responsi-
bility of financial institutions; and
(c) ensuring the integrity and stability of a Contracting Party's financial
system. 08
In that case, the investor-state tribunal must defer the decision on whether
such measures qualify as a defense to a different process.1 0 9 First, under
Article 20, the tribunal must seek a report from the contracting parties'
financial services authorities.11 0 If they agree on the matter and write a
report, that report binds the tribunal on whether the defense under Article
33(3) is valid."1 If the authorities do not agree, the parties could set up a
state-to-state tribunal to determine that particular issue, which would bind
the investor-state tribunal."x 2 This system integrates the state-to-state and
investor-state arbitral processes in a unique way. The recent financial cri-
sis appears to have informed this formulation.
The second notable feature of the dispute settlement mechanism set
up by the China-Canada BIT is the depth of the rules on the selection,
qualification, and appointment of arbitrators." 3 It covers such areas as
required subject matter-specific expertise and remuneration, and bestows
the default appointment authority on the Secretary General of ICSID.114
In a third feature, the BIT also has detailed provisions on procedural
matters that are ordinarily left for institutional rules, for instance on the
consolidation of cases,11 5 on third-party participation,1 6 and on interim
measures of preservation.'" 7 It also contains detailed rules on public
access to information about the proceedings and awards."1 8
The BIT adopts the default rule that the awards and the proceedings
shall be public but with broad exceptions for confidential information.'"'
Nevertheless, if the host state determines that it is in the public interest to
make not only the awards but all the submissions public, they will be made
public, though with confidential information redacted.1 20 The BIT leaves
the authority to determine what constitutes public interest to the host
state,'121 while giving the tribunal the authority to determine what consti-
108. Id. at art. 33(3)(a)-(c).
109. See id. at art. 20(2)(a).
110. Id.
111. Id. at art. 20(2).
112. Id. at art. 20(2)(c).
113. See id. at art. 24.
114. Id.
115. Id. at art. 26.
116. Id. at art. 27.
117. Id. at art. 31.
118. Id. at art. 28.
119. Id. at art. 28(1).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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tutes confidential information. 12 2 Interestingly, if and when the tribunal's
decision on confidentiality conflicts with the host state's freedom of infor-
mation laws, the BIT accords such laws primacy.' 2 3 This is significant in
view of the recent debate about the legitimacy of investor-state arbitration
that often focuses on the confidentiality or secrecy of proceedings of public
importance.' 2 4
The fourth notable feature pertains to permission for submissions by
interested third parties.1 25 In fact, the China-Canada BIT adds an elaborate
annex to the dispute resolution rule.1 26 This is undoubtedly a response to
the recent backlash against investor-state arbitration because of the per-
ceived impact on public interest and the desire by non-profit advocacy
groups to submit amicus briefs on matters they consider important, such
as the environment, labor and employment standards, corporate social
responsibility, and corruption.
A fifth feature relates to the governing substantive law. In a significant
departure from the traditional BITs that select the host state's laws as the
rule of decision, the China-Canada BIT expressly selects international law
as the rule of decision.' 2 7 It states in particular:
1. A Tribunal established under this Part shall decide the issues in dispute
in accordance with this Agreement, and applicable rules of international law,
and where relevant and as appropriate, take into consideration the law of the
host Contracting Party. An interpretation by the Contracting Parties of a
provision of this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal established
under this Part, and any award under this Part shall be consistent with such
interpretation.1 28
Hence, the application of the laws of the host state is ancillary and
supplemental. The China-Canada BIT thus reverses the roles that interna-
tional and domestic law play in the traditional BIT models, including the
various generations of Chinese BITs. In fact, the China-Canada BIT does
more than place international law above domestic law; it reduces the appli-
cation of domestic law to a merely informational role. Given the unending
controversy on the exact prescriptions of customary international law in
the area of international investment, this choice of law rule is sure to add to
the complexity of arbitral decision-making.
122. See id. at art. 28(5).
123. Id. ("5. To the extent that a Tribunal's confidentiality order designates informa-
tion as confidential and a Contracting Party's law on access to information requires
public access to that information, the Contracting Party's law on access to information
shall prevail. However, a Contracting Party should endeavour to apply its law on access
to information so as to protect information designated confidential by the Tribunal.")
124. Many writings address the contemporary debate about the legitimacy of the
investor-state arbitral regime. A notable contribution in this regard is a collection of
essays contained in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND
REAUTY (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010). See Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAw 150-51 (2007).
125. China-Canada BIT, supra note 68, at art. 29.
126. Id. at Annex C.29.
127. Id. at art. 30(1).
128. Id.
Vol. 49162
2016 China's Bilateral Investment Treaties with African States
Finally, the China-Canada BIT excepts a fair amount of matters from
the application of the treaty.' 29 In particular, the China-Canada BIT incor-
porates matters pertaining to "cultural industries," defined to include mat-
ters that are ordinarily considered to relate to freedom of speech;13 0
measures pertaining to the environment; '3 certain financial regulation;1 3 2
monetary, credit, and exchange rate polices;' 3 3 and matters relating to
national security,' 3 4 as well as those pertaining to the state's ability to reg-
ulate access to information.' 3 5
3. The Salient Features Recapped
As of this writing, the China-Canada BIT is the most contemporary
BIT in the world. It is significant not only because it is temporally the
latest to come into effect, but also because it has been duly negotiated
between a developed economy of the North and the world's second largest
economy, albeit one technically still considered a developing economy. It
also elaborates the fundamental principles and adds clarification as dis-
cussed above.
The China-Canada BIT, however, is not a Chinese model BIT; it is a
Canadian model BIT.1 36 It is perhaps the first such elaborate BIT and
might even signal what the U.S.-China BIT might look like because China
seems to have accepted many of the standard Canadian provisions, includ-
ing the definition of investment and investors. The China-Canada BIT also
contains elaborate exceptions suggesting compromises on many areas
including the state's right to regulate financial markets and the environ-
ment. It also makes provisions for transparency, attempts to define the
standards for indirect expropriation, and revamps the dispute settlement
provisions in an unprecedented way. Moreover, because it is a BIT that is
negotiated arguably between equals with a legitimate expectation of the
promotion and reciprocal protection of investment, and with due regard to
sustainability,1 3 7 the China-Canada BIT is a model that China should con-
sider adopting vis-A-vis African states with certain modifications on a case-
by-case basis. The following section discusses the implications for Africa.
129. Id. at art. 33.
130. Id. at art. 33(1).
131. Id. at art. 33(2).
132. Id. at art. 33(3).
133. Id. at art. 33(4).
134. Id. at art. 33(5).
135. Id. at art. 33(6).
136. For example, Canada's BIT with Nigeria is almost identical to the China-Canada
BIT. Compare China-Canada BIT, supra note 68, with Agreement Between Canada and
the Federal Republic of Nigeria for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-
Nigeria, May 6, 2014, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-com-
merciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/nigeria-agreement-nigerie.aspx?lang=eng. See Agreement
Between Canada and Mali for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Mali,
Nov. 28, 2014, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/
agr-acc/fipa-apie/mali-agreement.aspx?lang=eng. See generally Fortier, supra note 4, at
525-43 (discussing Canadian BITs).
137. See China-Canada BIT, supra note 68, at pmbl.
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B. China-Tanzania BIT (2013)
The China-Tanzania BIT is the most recent China-Africa BIT, having
been signed on March 24, 2013.138 It little resembles the China-Canada
BIT; rather it looks much more like the third generation BITs that China
signed in the 2000s. There are, however, some notable differences in defin-
ing the objectives, substantive obligations, and dispute settlement. They
are discussed below.
1. Substantive Obligations
The China-Tanzania BIT puts the policy objectives in its preamble as
follows:
The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of
The United Republic of Tanzania (hereinafter referred to as the Contracting
Parties);
Intending to create favourable conditions for investment by investors of one
Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party;
Recognizing that the reciprocal encouragement, promotion and protection of
such investment on the basis of equality and mutual benefit will be condu-
cive to stimulating the business initiative of the investors and will increase
economic prosperity in both States;
Respecting the economic sovereignty of both States;
Encouraging investors to respect corporate social responsibilities; and
Desiring to intensify the cooperation between both States, to promote
healthy, stable and sustainable economic development, and to improve the
standard of living of nationals. 1 3 9
There are certain additions to this BIT in comparison to the China-Canada
BIT, most notably the part that says "to promote healthy, stable and sus-
tainable economic development, and to improve the standard of living of
nationals."' 4 0 Although the policy objective is stated this way, as dis-
cussed below, there are no considerable changes in the BIT that would
allow for the conclusion that substantive changes were made to existing
BIT models to achieve the newly stated objectives. It is also important to
note, despite the statement that that the main policy underpinning this is
the "reciprocal encouragement, promotion and protection" of invest-
ment,14 1 the flow of investment is still, as in North-Africa relations, one-
way.
138. For signature statuses, see International Investment Agreements Navigator, INv.
PoL'Y HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/42#iialnnerMenu
(last visited Nov. 23, 2015). See also Agreement Between the Government of the People's
Republic of China and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania Concerning
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, China-Tanz., Mar. 24, 2013
[hereinafter China-Tanzania BIT], http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/tfs/201409/20140928
170911164.doc.
139. China-Tanzania BIT, supra note 138, at pmbl.
140. Compare id., with China-Canada BIT, supra note 68.
141. China-Tanzania BIT, supra note 138, at pmbl.
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The definition of investment is essentially taken from the old Chinese
BITs' 4 2 with one notable elaboration on claims to money14 3 :
For the avoidance of doubt, claims to money in Paragraph 1(c) of this Article
does not include (a) claims to money that arise solely from commercial con-
tracts for the sale of goods or services by a national or enterprise in the
territory of the other Contracting Party; or (b) claims to money that arise
from marriage or inheritance and that have no characteristics of an
investment.1 4 4
The rule under subsection (a) that expressly excludes claims to money
from purely commercial sales of goods is a common rule enshrined in the
China-Canada BIT and other BITs, as well as other investment treaties like
NAFTA.1 4 5 The rules under subsection (b) on marriage and inheritance
are fairly new, however, and are perhaps peculiar to China-Tanzania rela-
tions. It would be interesting to examine whether it is a growing phenome-
non signaling significant people-to-people relations to the point where such
issues are deserving of particular mention in treaties.
The China-Tanzania BIT defines the term "investor" in the same man-
ner as older generation BITs.1 46 Unlike the China-Canada BIT, the China-
Tanzania BIT, by limiting the definition to nationals only, does not include
permanent residents of the contracting parties.' 4 7
In terms of treatment, while the content appears to be more or less the
same as the third generation model discussed above (China-Uganda or
China-Germany), the China-Tanzania BIT adds an exception with the
potential to swallow the rule. 148 It reads:
1. Without prejudice to its applicable laws and regulations, with respect to
the operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, sale or disposi-
tion of the investments in its territory, each Contracting Party shall accord to
investors of the other Contracting Party and their associated investments
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to its own investors and
associated investments in like circumstances.
2. Each Contracting Party, in accordance with its laws and regulations, may
grant incentives or preferences to its nationals for the purpose of developing
and stimulating local entrepreneurship provided that such measures shall
not significantly affect the investments and activities of the investors of the
other Contracting Party.' 4 9
142. Compare China-Tanzania BIT, supra note 138, at art. 1(1), with China-Sweden
BIT, supra note 23, at art. 1(1).
143. Compare China-Tanzania BIT, supra note 138, at art. 1(1), with China-Sweden
BIT, supra note 23, at art. 1(1).
144. China-Tanzania BIT, supra note 138, at art. 1(1).
145. Compare China-Canada BIT, supra note 68, at art. 1(1), with NAFTA, supra note
69.
146. Compare China-Tanzania BIT, supra note 138, at art. 1(2), with China-Sweden
BIT, supra note 23, at art. 1(2).
147. Compare China-Tanzania BIT, supra note 138, at art. 1(2), with China-Canada
BIT, supra note 68, at art. 1(2).
148. China-Tanzania BIT, supra note 138, at art. 3.
149. Id.
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Both subsections leave significant leeway for the host state to limit National
Treatment through laws and regulations. The first subsection subjects the
rule to applicable laws and regulations while the second subsection allows
preferential treatment to nationals as long as such incentives "shall not sig-
nificantly affect" the investor's investments.15 0 This is a remarkable retreat
from the established National Treatment clause of the third generation Chi-
nese BITs. There is almost no doubt that this provision was inserted to
accommodate Tanzania's demands as it is the main recipient of the invest-
ment. The fact that China agreed to this regression is remarkable because
Tanzania's concerns and desire to benefit some local industries could have
been best addressed at the time of admission of the investment and
through other means that follow the very well-established principle of inter-
national investment law allowing broad areas of host state discretion.
The MFN provision is standard and does not contain any notable
modifications.15 1 Consistent with the latest models, the MFN provision
does not apply to dispute settlement provisions.' 5 2 The fair and equitable
treatment provision, however, contains some odd and unclear additions. It
reads in part:
1. Each Contracting Party shall ensure that it accords to investors of the
other Contracting Party and associated investments in its territory fair and
equitable treatment and full protection and security.
2. "Fair and equitable treatment" means that investors of one Contracting
Party shall not be denied fair judicial proceedings by the other Contracting
Party or be treated with obvious discriminatory or arbitrary measures.
3. "Full protection and security" requires that Contracting Parties take rea-
sonable and necessary police measures when performing the duty of ensur-
ing investment protection and security. However, it does not mean, under
any circumstances, that investors shall be accorded treatment more favour-
able than nationals of the Contracting Party in whose territory the invest-
ment has been made.' 5 3
The meaning that the China-Tanzania BIT gives to "fair and equitable treat-
ment" and "full protection and security" appears unusual and very specific
to this particular BIT. It categorically links the definition of fair and equi-
table treatment to fair judicial proceedings. This is especially odd consid-
ering that the only time disputes could go to judicial proceedings is if the
investor chooses to do so under the dispute settlement provisions dis-
cussed below.' 54
The definition of full protection and security also appears to be very
literal because it limits the meaning to physical protection and security. 15 5
It is a provision clearly negotiated for specific concerns-most likely con-
cerns of physical security of Chinese operations in Tanzania. That the
150. Id.
151. Id. at art. 4.
152. Id.
153. Id. at art. 5.
154. Id. at art. 13.
155. Id. at art. 5.
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clause purports to equalize protection and security to nationals is doubly
odd, though it is clearly a result of political compromise.
The China-Canada BIT, on the other hand, articulates the concept of
fair and equitable treatment in simple terms as follows:
1. Each Contracting Party shall accord to covered investments fair and equi-
table treatment and full protection and security, in accordance with interna-
tional law.
2. The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and
security" in paragraph I do not require treatment in addition to or beyond
that which is required by the international law minimum standard of treat-
ment of aliens as evidenced by general State practice accepted as law.1 5 6
This is generally understood to mean full protection and security, but the
China-Tanzania BIT's fair and equitable treatment provision makes no ref-
erence to international standards and limits it to physical protection by
linking it to police action.' 5 7 It seems to be unique in that sense. The
expropriation provision' 5 8 is unremarkable, except for its addition of a
modem definition of indirect expropriation, a definition similar to the
China-Canada BIT's definition of indirect expropriation.1 59
One notable addition to the third generation BIT is a provision on
health and environment.' 60 Its formulation has a striking resemblance
with the latest U.S. Model BIT. It reads in relevant part:
1. The Contracting Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage
investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures.
Accordingly, a Contracting Party should not waive or otherwise derogate
from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such measures as an
encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention in
its territory of an investment of an investor.
2. Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or unjustifi-
able manner, or do not constitute a disguised restriction on international
investment, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Con-
tracting Party from adopting or maintaining environmental measures neces-
sary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.161
It is a very weak formulation as far as protection of the environment is
concerned because it uses terms such as "it is inappropriate," rather than
mandatory language. Similarly, the second provision replaces mandatory
language with the term "unjustifiable." Indeed, it appears that this formu-
lation is partly informed by the 2004 U.S. Model BIT.162 Regardless, given
156. China-Canada BIT, supra note 68, at art. 4.
157. China-Tanzania BIT, supra note 138, at art. 5.
158. Id. at art. 6.
159. Compare China-Canada BIT, supra note 68, at Annex B.10, with China-Tanzania
BIT, supra note 138, at art. 6(2).
160. China-Tanzania BIT, supra note 138, at art. 10.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, Rwanda-U.S., art. 12, Feb. 19, 2008, http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2241.
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the absence of any mention of the environment in the previous Chinese BIT
models, this is a step forward.
2. Dispute Settlement
The dispute settlement provision is also unremarkable. It gives the
investor four options: domestic court litigation in the host state, ICSID
arbitration, ad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL Rules, and ad hoc arbitra-
tion under any other agreed rules.163 The host state retains the right to
require the exhaustion of local administrative remedies before the investor
can exercise the right to resort to international arbitration.1 6 4
The choice of substantive law provision is important to highlight.
With one exception, the provisions of the BIT and rules of international
law govern.1 65 The exception relates to contractual commitments. It reads
in part: "Each Contracting Party shall observe any written commitments in
the form of agreement or contract it may have entered into with the inves-
tors of the other Contracting Party with regard to their investments."l 6 6
Disputes relating to written commitments are subject to
(a) the rules of law as may be agreed by the disputing parties; or (b) if the
rules of law have not been agreed: (i) the law of the Contracting Party where
the investment has been made, including its rules on the conflict of laws;
and (ii) such rules of international law as may be applicable.1 6 7
The only conceivable way that this exception would have meaning is if the
investor choses to bring a treaty action rather than a contract action for
breach of contract or perhaps both, if it makes sense under the circum-
stances. In any case, the default choice is international law with the excep-
tion of contract claims.1 68
The remedies provision is notable for its imprecision. It reads:
Unless the disputing parties agree otherwise, where an award affirms that a
Contracting Party has breached its obligations under this Agreement, the
tribunal may only award, separately or in combination:
(a) monetary damages and any applicable interest;
(b) restitution of property, in which case the award may specify monetary
damages and corresponding interest in lieu of restitution.16 9
The remedies are damages and/or restitution.1 7 0 The restitution provision
is indeterminate. It gives the decision maker the discretion to award dam-
ages in lieu of restitution.171 It may be construed as allowing specific or
forced performance against the host state unless the decision maker
163. China-Tanzania BIT, supra note 138, at art. 13(2).
164. Id.
165. Id. at art. 13(6).
166. Id. at art. 14(2).
167. Id. at art. 13(6).
168. Id.
169. Id. at art. 13(7).
170. Id.
171. Id.
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chooses to award damages instead. This is also not a very common
formulation.
3. Salient Features Recapped
As of this writing, the China-Tanzania BIT is the most recent BIT that
China has signed with an African state. Although it contains some contem-
porary provisions on such issues as indirect expropriation and environ-
mental regulations, it remains decidedly consistent with the model China
used in the 2000s. The peculiar characteristics, which are not especially
significant, include:
* A focus on sustainable development in the preamble but not in the text in
any significant way;
* A relatively broad definition of investment excluding claims for money for
the sale of goods and claims for money from marriages and inheritance,
which is very peculiar;
* A watered down version of National Treatment allowing preferential treat-
ment of nationals for the purpose of encouraging local entrepreneurs;
* A fair and equitable treatment provision that limits the application to fair
judicial proceedings;
* A protection and security provision that limits the meaning to police pro-
tection of physical investment;
* An elaborate definition of indirect expropriation; and
* A dispute settlement provision that offers the investor four options and
allows for damages as well as restitution as discretionary remedies.
The above analysis suggests that it is difficult to classify the China-
Tanzania BIT as North-South or South-South. Although China is evidently
the stronger party, it does not appear that it took advantage of its superior
economic standing in the BIT with Tanzania. If anything, it seems like
some of the added provisions were not carefully considered. In fact, there
might even be some mechanical deficiencies in, for example, the definition
of fair and equitable treatment as well as in the protection and security
provisions.
III. The China-Canada BIT's Implications for Africa
As indicated above, the China-Canada BIT is a Canadian model, not a
Chinese model. China's adoption of the Canadian BIT model signals at
least two developments: (1) recognition of the inadequacies of the various
BIT modes that it used in the past, and (2) its willingness to make com-
promises on certain matters, including the definition of investment and
investor, access to information, and dispute settlement. The China-Canada
BIT, however, appears to be as much about the parties' willingness to defer
agreement on certain matters as it is about their actual agreements. This
view finds support in the numerous exceptions and exclusions in areas
such as "cultural industries"; the environment; financial regulation; mone-
tary, credit, and exchange rate polices; national security; and access to
information.
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On the other hand, China and Canada were able to agree on such
areas as the definition of investment; standards of treatment, including
expropriation standards and what constitutes indirect expropriation; stan-
dards of compensation; and, most importantly, elaborate mechanisms of
dispute settlement. China has shown its willingness to subscribe to these
principles, at least with respect to its relations with Canada. Technically,
henceforth, there will be no impediments to applying these principles vis-A-
vis African states to the extent that the old BITs need to be renewed and
new BITs need to be entered into. Because China has not strictly used any
of its models with any degree of notable consistency, however, it is difficult
to say with any certainty whether the BIT with Canada is a new model that
China is willing to use in its relations with other states or whether it is one-
of-a-kind. Then again, China's agreement on certain matters, such as inter-
national law as a substantive rule of decision, signals a decision to accept
the concepts of international law, at least in principle.
Whether the Canadian model is a good model for Africa is, however,
questionable for several reasons. Although it has sustainable development
as its theoretical underpinning, its formulation of rules that propel that
objective further is not satisfying. Given the time at which it was signed
and ratified, it appears to be a rejection of more progressive models, such
as the IISD Model, which contains many more provisions designed to foster
sustainable development. Although the China-Canada model could serve
as a good starting point for future China-Africa BITs or modification of the
existing ones, some important provisions that are not covered in the China-
Canada BIT need to be considered. These are best articulated in the IISD
Model. Some of the necessary provisions are discussed in brief below.
A. Environmental Protection
The current state of the economic relations between China and Africa
appears to mirror the relationship between the United States and China
over the past three to four decades, which was characterized by the reloca-
tion of environmentally sensitive manufacturing industries to China. With
Chinese attainment of immense economic progress, which raised the living
standards of its population, the trend now seems to be for the relocation of
environmentally sensitive manufacturing industries from China to Africa.
Although the relocation of any industries to Africa represents positive
development for Africa, provisions in investment treaties could be used to
minimize the adverse environmental impacts thereof. The China-Canada
BIT retreated to domestic laws without either suggesting common stan-
dards or even prescribing minimum standards. For China and Africa, it is
important to agree on certain fundamental environmental standards that
investors must respect in the host country. A good model in this regard is
the IISD Model.
There are several important provisions that should be considered for
inclusion. They include:
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* Investors and investments shall strive, through their management policies
and practices, to contribute to the development objectives of the host
states and the local levels of government where the investment is
located.1 7 2
* On all occasions, the investor or investment shall comply with the mini-
mum standards on environmental impact assessment and screening that
the Parties shall adopt at the first meeting of the Parties, to the extent
these are applicable to the investment in question.17 3
* Investors, their investment and host state authorities shall apply the pre-
cautionary principle to their environmental impact assessment and to
decisions taken in relation to a proposed investment, including any neces-
sary mitigating or alternative approaches to the investment, or precluding
the investment if necessary.1 74
* Investments shall, in keeping with good practice requirements relating to
the size and nature of the investment, maintain an environmental manage-
ment system. Companies with over [2501[500] employees, or in areas of
resource exploitation or high-risk industrial enterprises, shall maintain a
current certification to ISO 14001 or an equivalent environmental man-
agement standard: Emergency response and decommissioning plans shall
be included in the environmental management system process.1 75
B. Labor Standards
One of the competitive advantages of Africa, which is a draw to Chi-
nese companies, is the cost of labor. By default, the kinds of industries
that China sets up in Africa are labor-intensive.' 7 6 The management of
labor relations is key for the success of the investment. Provisions for com-
mon labor standards are very useful. An example of such standards is
again provided in the IISD Model. It incorporates matured international
labor standards in the following terms: "Investors and investments shall act
in accordance with core labor standards as required by the ILO Declaration
on Fundamental Principles and Rights of Work, 1998."'"7 Agreeing on
minimum labor standards is essential especially for Africa because of the
states of economic development and labor conditions in many of its
countries.
C. Corporate Social Responsibility
Chinese companies in Africa come in different shapes and sizes.
Moreover, shell companies with nominal or no relation to China could
claim to be Chinese companies and attempt to gain inappropriate eco-
172. MANN, supra note 104, at art. 11(C).
173. See id. at art. 12(A).
174. Id. at art. 12(D).
175. Id. at art. 14(A). Bracketed language allows contracting parties to tailor the
agreement to their specific needs through negotiation.
176. HARRY G. BROADMAN, SEPARATING FACT FROM FICTION IN THE CHINA-AFRICA RELA-
TIONSHIP 3 (2013), http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/psrc/pdf/pwc-gridlines-separating-fact-
from-fiction-in-the-china-africa-relationship.pdf.
177. MANN, supra note 104, at art. 14(C).
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nomic advantages. 178 The temptation to take advantage of vulnerable and
economically disadvantaged populations is also very high. For these and
related reasons, it is essential to prescribe certain minimum standards for
corporate social responsibility. Again, relevant provisions in the IISD
Model are instructive. Some are reproduced below.
(A) Investments shall meet or exceed national and internationally accepted
standards of corporate governance for the sector involved, in particular for
transparency and accounting practices.
(B) Investors and investments shall make available to the public any invest-
ment contract or agreement with the host state government(s) involved in
the investment authorization process, subject to the redaction of confidential
business information. Investors or investments shall publish all information
relating to payments made to host state public authorities, including taxes,
royalties, surcharges, fees and all other payments.
(C) Investments shall establish and maintain, where appropriate, local com-
munity liaison processes, in accordance with internationally accepted stan-
dards when available.
(D) Where relevant internationally accepted standards of the type described
in this Article are not available or have been developed without the participa-
tion of developing countries, the Conference of the Parties may establish
such standards.' 7 9
Sub-paragraph D is most likely to be the case in any China-Africa BIT nego-
tiations. This would allow the parties the opportunity to incorporate prin-
ciples that are most suitable for them even when it means lowering the
minimum standards when absolutely necessary to serve more important
and compelling societal needs that may not be appreciated in the devel-
oped world.
D. Corruption
Corruption is a serious problem in China as well as in many African
countries. There are now defined legal standards common to China and
Africa. These standards are incorporated in the United Nations Conven-
tion against Corruption.1 0 It is important that investment treaties make
reference to these universally agreed principles with due regard to the spe-
cific circumstances of each contracting party. Guidance could also be
sought from the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combatting
Corruption"s' and the domestic laws of the contracting parties.
178. The corporate shell concept is used in innumerable contexts around the world,
and the problem seems particularly acute in China given restrictions on foreign owner-
ship of certain interests. See, e.g., Alibaba's Political Risk, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 19, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/alibabas-political-risk-1411059836.
179. MANN, supra note 104, at art. 15.
180. G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Convention against Corruption (Oct. 31, 2003).
181. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combatting Corruption (July 11,
2003), http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/treaties/7786-file-africanunion-con
vention preventingcombating-corruption.pdf.
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E. Dispute Settlement and Host State Standing
Traditionally, investor-state dispute settlement is a mechanism essen-
tially designed to offer the investor the opportunity to challenge the legality
of host actions or seek compensation for compensable breaches. Such
international legal recourse is deemed to be necessary because of the suspi-
cion that domestic legal process would be inadequate or unfair to the inves-
tor.18 2 In other words, more developed Northern economies have always
insisted on a mechanism of international dispute settlement because of the
perceived deficiencies of domestic courts in developing countries, often
considered corrupt, biased, inefficient, or dependent on the executive.' 8 3
This philosophy underestimates the powers of Northern corporations and
overestimates the powers and discretions of governments of developing
countries.
The dispute settlement provisions contained in most BITs essentially
shift the burden of perceived domestic court problems, especially the
assumed bias problem, onto the host state by creating an international
mechanism that structurally limits the host state's ability to pursue a legal
process. Without detailing the issues of bias that developing host states
regularly face in international arbitral fora, denial of access or standing is a
key feature of the traditional BITs. China and its various African counter-
parts have also adopted a system that offers one of the parties access to
arbitration, while denying it to the other. The IISD Model addresses this
problem. The relevant provision in the IISD Model is exemplary. It reads
in pertinent part:
In the event of a dispute between a Party and an investor or investment relat-
ing to the abrogation of said investor's or investment's rights under Article
18 of this Agreement, and such dispute has not been resolved pursuant to
good faith efforts in accordance with Article 42, a Party may initiate an arbi-
tration in accordance with the rules in this Agreement, including Annex A of
this Agreement, applying them mutatis mutandis to the context of a state-
investor/investment dispute. 8 4
The IISD Model rightfully assumes that rights and obligations are
reciprocal and that the investor's abrogation of its obligations is equally
actionable. The host state's access to international arbitration has more
than theoretical importance because of the arguably better enforceability of
international arbitral awards compared to domestic court judgments,
whether through the ICSID Convention, the New York Convention, or some
other arrangement. In any case, international contracts involving foreign
investors often provide for international arbitration without limiting access
to only one of the parties. Limiting access to the investor ignores reciprocal
obligations and the benefits of international arbitration to host states. In
this regard the dispute settlement provisions contained in the traditional
BITs are outdated.
182. MAN, supra note 104, at art. 45.
183. See id. at art. 45(B).
184. Id. at art. 44(A).
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IV. Policy Underpinnings: Is China Resolving the Dilemma by
Silence?
China does not yet seem to have appreciated its position as the second
largest economy in the world, or perhaps it is treating its ascendance with
caution. Although the various Chinese BIT models are now being talked
about as if China had followed a systematic model-based BIT policy, this
does not appear to comport with reality. A close examination of the vari-
ous generations of BITs suggests some level of conscious progression over
the decades, from merely receiving investment and worrying about investor
excesses, to having some sensitivity to investor rights as China continues to
send immense capital abroad. But, again, China's policy directions do not
appear to be as cogently and intentionally articulated as those of the
United States.
The United States articulates its BIT policy in the following terms:
* The U.S. bilateral investment treaty (BIT) program helps to protect private
investment, to develop market-oriented policies in partner countries, and
to promote U.S. exports.
* The BIT program's basic aims are:
o to protect investment abroad in countries where investor rights are not
already protected through existing agreements (such as modern treaties
of friendship, commerce, and navigation, or free trade agreements);
o to encourage the adoption of market-oriented domestic policies that
treat private investment in an open, transparent, and non-discrimina-
tory way; and
a to support the development of international law standards consistent
with these objectives.
* U.S. BITs provide investors with six core benefits:
o U.S. BITs require that investors and their "covered investments" (that is,
investments of a national or company of one BIT party in the territory
of the other party) be treated as favorably as the host party treats its
own investors and their investments or investors and investments from
any third country. The BIT generally affords the better of National
Treatment or most-favored-nation treatment for the full life-cycle of
investment-from establishment or acquisition, through management,
operation, and expansion, to disposition.
o BITs establish clear limits on the expropriation of investments and pro-
vide for payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation
when expropriation takes place.
o BITs provide for the transferability of investment-related funds into and
out of a host country without delay and using a market rate of
exchange.
o BITs restrict the imposition of performance requirements, such as local
content targets or export quotas, as a condition for the establishment,
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, or operation of an
investment.
o BITs give covered investors the right to engage the top managerial per-
sonnel of their choice, regardless of nationality.
o BITs give investors from each party the right to submit an investment
dispute with the government of the other party to international
arbitration.
There is no requirement to use that country's domestic courts.
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* The United States negotiates BITs on the basis of a model text.18 5
China is now in a position to say what it wants to say, but it is not
saying it. Although part of that is cultural, part of it is a serious philosoph-
ical dilemma that is difficult to resolve in the real world. First, China has to
reconcile its position as the world's number one recipient of foreign direct
investment' 86 with its capacity as the world's second largest exporter of
capital. 18 7 It is conflicted between protecting its home industries and its
desire to have its investors succeed in foreign domains. No country has
previously faced this dilemma to such an extent. It is a real dilemma that
needs resolution but, so far, China seems to have chosen to resolve it by
complicity, one BIT at a time-that is, by continuing to sign BITs with no
coherent policy underpinnings. The most recent ratification of the Cana-
dian Model BIT and the signing of the China-Tanzania BIT, which could
not be more different in both structure and content, are demonstrations of
that.
The second dilemma relates to managing perception. This is equally
serious. So far, there is no sufficient evidence that China is systematically
using BITs for one-way protection of its economic interests vis-A-vis
Africa.' 8 8 In fact, it appears that China is resolving the dilemma by
silence. Although some of the BITs have the hallmarks of the traditional
North-South BITs, there is no evidence that China is systematically using
BITs to push purposefully a particular economic agenda in Africa. The
older BITs, such as China-Sweden and China-Ghana, and China-Iceland
and China-Egypt, and China-Germany and China-Uganda, do not tell a
coherent story. The recent China-Canada BIT is just a Canadian model
that China accepted with some notable additions that China might have
proposed. It is thus fair to conclude that with respect to modernizing its
BITs with Africa, China's silence is conspicuous.
Conclusion
China's rapid but inadequate progress is confusing traditional classifi-
cations and traditional classifiers who look for patterns. While still con-
sidered a developing country, China has more economic power than most
developed countries. In the area of investment law, China's rapid ascent
coupled with its unique ideological past appears to have deprived it of the
opportunity to deliberate on options, refine theory, and pursue a system-
atic BIT program like that of the United States. The reality is that today's
China-Africa BIT regime is sporadic, outdated, uninformed by recent devel-
185. Bilateral Investment Treaties, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (2005),
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties.
186. Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, Africa-China Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Critique, 35
MICH. J. INT'L L. 131, 153 (2013).
187. Id. at 150.
188. But see, e.g., id. at 205-06. Professor Ofodile appears to be of the opinion that
there is some coherence and systematic employment of BITs by China. The author of
this Article sees no evidence of that. The comparative analysis of the China-Sweden and
China-Ghana BITs does not suggest any particular North-South or South-South pattern.
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opments, incoherent, and even purposeless, as can be seen from the exam-
ples profiled above.
Although some recent BITs show traces of North-South characteristics,
the evidence is insufficient to conclude that China is purposefully attempt-
ing to mimic Africa's traditional Northern partners. If anything, China's
BIT program appears to be a simple, benign, and convenient replication of
existing text.
In any case, the existing China-Africa BITs do not appear to be serving
any meaningful purpose at the moment. China and African states need to
consider renegotiating all three previous BITs as well as the latest genera-
tion ones. The negotiation must be informed by existing models, includ-
ing the most recent Canadian BIT model for context, and, more
importantly, the IISD Model BIT as it pertains to both the substantive and
the dispute settlement provisions. As Chinese investment in Africa
increases in scale and complexity, and as some African states also consider
investing in China, or at least in Chinese interests, refining the investment
regime is key in growing enterprise and achieving the desired objective of
sustainable development both in China and in Africa.
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Appendix 1
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Entry
Into National
Partner Signature Force Language Treatment MFN ICSID
Chinese BIT Generation I
Ghana 12-Oct-89 22-Nov-91 English Yes No*
Chinese BIT Generation II
Egypt 21-Apr-94 1-Apr-96 English Yes
Morocco 27-Mar-95 27-Nov-99 French Yes Yes
Mauritius 4-May-96 8-Jun-97 English Yes No*
Zimbabwe 21-May-96 1-Mar-98 English Yes No*
Zambia 21-Jun-96 English Yes No*
Algeria 17-Oct-96 28-Jan-03 French Yes
English
Gabon 9-May-97 16-Feb-09 English Yes Yes Yes
Cameroon 10-Sep-97 French Yes Yes
Sudan 30-May-97 1-Jul-98 English Yes No*
Nigeria (Abolished) 12-May-97 Yes Yes
Congo, DR 18-Dec-97 Yes
South Africa 30-Dec-97 1-Apr-98 English Yes Yes No*
Chinese BIT Generation III & IV
Cape Verde 21-Apr-98 1-Jan-01 English Yes Yes No*
Ethiopia 11-May-98 1-May-00 English Yes Yes
Congo 20-Mar-00 Yes Yes
Botswana 12-Jun-00 English Yes Yes Yes
Sierra Leone 16-May-01 English Yes Yes Yes
Mozambique 10-Jul-01 26-Feb-02 English Yes Yes Yes
Kenya 16-Jul-01 Yes Yes
Nigeria (Re-signature) 27-Aug-01 18-Feb-01 English Yes Yes No*
Cote dIvoire 30-Sep-02 English Yes Yes Yes
Djibouti 18-Aug-03 English Yes Yes Yes
Benin 18-Feb-04 English Yes Yes Yes
Uganda 27-May-04 English Yes Yes Yes
Tunisia 21-Jun-04 1-Jul-06 English Yes Yes Yes
Equatorial Guinea 20-Oct-05 15-Nov-06 English Yes Yes
Namibia 17-Nov-05 English Yes No
Guinea 18-Nov-05 Yes
Madagascar 21-Nov-05 1-Jun-07 English Yes Yes Yes
French
Seychelles 10-Feb-07 English Yes Yes Yes
Mali 12-Feb-09 16-Jul-09 French Yes
Chad 26-Apr-10 Yes
Libya (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) 4-Aug-10 Yes
Democratic Republic of Congo 11-Aug-11 Yes
Tanzania 24-Mar-13 English Yes Yes Yes
NOTES:
National Treatment: GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 7, at 135 n.102.
MFN: "More precisely all of them [Chinese BITS] have an MFN clause, whilst fewer than half of them also
have an NT clause." GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 7, at 140.
ICSID: No* -but does include reference to ICSID (for procedural rules or arbitrator nomination)

